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Abstract
The crux of the dispute on the mutual relations between attention and 
consciousness, and to which I have referred in this paper, lies in the 
question of what can be attended in spatial attention that obviously 
resonates with the phenomenological issue of intentionality (e.g., the 
noesis-noema structure). The discussion has been initiated by Christopher 
Mole. He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to 
which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one 
does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of. In other 
words, attention is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not 
necessary for consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant 
of attention, but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. 
Mole seeks to validate his stance with data from psychology labs. His 
view is, however, partly confronted, for instance, by Robert Kentridge, 
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Lee de-Wit and Charles Heywood, who used their experimental research 
on a neurological condition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation 
between attention and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not 
a sufficient precondition for visual awareness. In this meta-theoretical state 
of affairs, I would like to focus on the cognitive phenomenon most often 
referred to as Inhibition of Return (IOR) and suggest that, following its 
micro dynamics from the perspective of micro-phenomenology, it can be 
used to actually showcase all of the options on both sides of the argument. 
One of my leading goals would be also to follow Mole’s attempt to link 
attention with agency but where we differ is that I wish to heuristically 
articulate the matter in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological 
notion of embodied pre-reflective intentionality.
Keywords: inhibition of return (IOR), attention, consciousness, intention-
ality, embodied cognition.
Abstrakt
Zagadnieniem kluczowym w dyskusji na temat związku uwagi ze świa-
domością, do której nawiązuje poniższy tekst, staje się pytanie o to, 
co może stanowić przedmiot uwagi wzrokowo-przestrzennej. Można je 
oczywiście także odnieść do fenomenologicznej problematyki intencjo-
nalności (np. sprawy relacji noeza-noemat). W dyskusji tej Christopher 
Mole przywołuje obecne na gruncie psychologii potocznej przekona-
nie, zgodnie z którym jesteśmy świadomi wszystkiego, na co zwracamy 
uwagę, ale nie zwracamy uwagi na wszystko, czego jesteśmy świadomi. 
Innymi słowy, uwaga traktowana jest tutaj jako warunek wystarcza-
jący, ale niekonieczny dla świadomości. Mole przywołuje również na 
poparcie tej tezy wyniki badań z zakresu psychologii eksperymental-
nej. Jednakże, badania chociażby Roberta Kentridge’a, Lee de-Wita 
i Charlesa Heywooda, dotyczące zaburzenia neurologicznego zwanego 
ślepowidzeniem (blindsight), częściowo podważają tezę prezentowaną 
przez Mole’a, wskazując na możliwość dysocjacji uwagi i świadomo-
ści w sytuacji, gdy uwaga wzrokowo-przestrzenna nie jest warunkiem 
wystarczającym dla świadomej percepcji. W kontekście przywołanej 
dyskusji tematem obecnego artykułu jest efekt poznawczy określany 
najczęściej jako hamowanie powrotu [uwagi] ( Inhibition of Return – IOR). 
Sądzę mianowicie, że przy zastosowaniu tzw. metody mikrofenomeno-
logii można w zależności od momentu dynamicznej mikrostruktury tego 
fenomenu wskazać w jego przebiegu wszystkie opcje, które pojawiają 
się w powyższej dyskusji. Jednym z wiodących zagadnień artykułu jest 
również propozycja Mole’a powiązania pojęcia uwagi z problematyką 
sprawczości (agency). Niejako w odpowiedzi podjęta zostanie tutaj 
próba rekonceptualizacji pojęcia uwagi w kategoriach ucieleśnionej 
Inhibition of Return (IOR) 295
prerefleksyjnej intencjonalności sformułowanej na gruncie fenomeno-
logii przez Maurice’a Merleau-Ponty’ego. 
Słowa klucze: hamowanie powrotu uwagi (IOR), uwaga, świadomość, 
intencjonalność, ucieleśnione poznanie
1. The Attention-Consciousness Problem: Introductory 
Remarks
According to Brentano’s famous dictum, “[e]very mental phenom-
enon includes something like object within itself … We can, therefore, 
define mental phenomena by saying that they are those phenomena 
which contain an object intentionally within themselves.”1 Brentano’s 
claim, and that of Husserl which followed,2 of the “inexistence” of objects 
within intentional acts was, however, challenged by Merleau-Ponty.3 
According to his notion of pre-reflective intentionality, it is a condition 
of directing intentional acts towards the Lifeworld rather than being of 
or about anything specific.4 This fundamental issue of the relationship 
between an intentional act and its object resonates throughout the dis-
pute between Christopher Mole5 and Robert Kentridge, Lee de-Wit and 
Charles Heywood6 on the mutual relations between attention and con-
sciousness, which has been chronicled in the Journal of Consciousness 
Studies, even though the authors do not choose to explicitly situate it in 
this context. They have mainly focused on the question of what can be 
attended to in spatial attention.
1 Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, eds. Linda L. McAlister, 
Antos C. Rancurello, Dailey B. Terrell, Engl. trans. Linda L. McAlister (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1874/1973), 88–89.
2 Edmund Husserl, Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and a Phenomenological 
Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, Engl. trans. Fred 
Kersten, Collected Works, Vol. II (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1913/1982).
3 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Engl. trans. Colin Smith 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London/New York, 1945/62).
4 On this point see also Martina Reuter, “Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Pre-Reflective 
Intentionality,” Synthese 118, no. 1 (1999): 69–88.
5 Christopher Mole, “Attention and Consciousness,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 15, 
no. 4, (2008): 86–104; idem, “Attention to Unseen Objects”, Journal of Consciousness 
Studies 21, no. 11–12 (2014): 41–56.
6 Robert W. Kentridge, Lee de-Wit, Charles A. Heywood, “What is attended in spatial 
attention?”, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 15 (2008): 105–111.
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The context for this dispute is the renaissance of interest in the ques-
tion of consciousness on the part of experimental psychologists. Having 
previously considered it too ephemeral a topic, due to its subtle conceptu-
al nature and wishing to avoid its inherent philosophical ambiguity, they 
began to reintroduce consciousness under the code name of attention, 
applying theories and findings to it which had been derived in attention 
labs. This tactic of philosophy-avoidance and hunting for correlations has 
already been revealed in the “word of warning” by Alan Allport.7 From 
the phenomenologist’s purview, it is reminiscent of Virgil’s Timeo Danaos 
et dona ferentes phrase, with experimental psychologists playing the role 
of the devious “Greeks.” Giving consciousness a deflationary treatment 
and accounting for it in terms of attentional processes may only further 
obfuscate the mutual relationship of both categories in a way that it 
would be dubbed as the attention-consciousness problem, or perhaps 
more adequately – the consciousness-attention problem. This categorial 
ambiguity was highlighted by Mole, who initiated a discussion with the 
intention of shedding more light on the issue. 
He began by calling for a commonsense psychology, according to 
which one is conscious of everything that one pays attention to, but one 
does not pay attention to all the things that one is conscious of, seeking 
to validate it with data from psychology labs. In other words, attention 
is supposed to be a condition which is sufficient but not necessary for 
consciousness, i.e., consciousness is a necessary concomitant of attention, 
but attention is not a necessary concomitant of consciousness. Initially, he 
partly confronted this view with the stance of Kentridge, Heywood and 
Weiskrantz8 who used their experimental research on a neurological con-
dition called blindsight as evidence of a dissociation between attention 
and consciousness, i.e., that visual attention is not a sufficient precondi-
tion for visual awareness. Blindsight is a consequence of damage to the 
primary visual cortex, as a result of which patients become blind in part 
or all of their visual field. They are, however, still able to perform visual 
tasks, although they do not have conscious experience of the stimuli to 
which they are responding. In their experiments, the blindsight patient 
was asked to make guesses about whether a target appears either in a cued 
or an uncued locations or not, both of which were in the blind part of 
7 On this point see p. 113 in Alan Allport, “Attention and performance,” in Cognitive Psy-
chology: New Directions, ed. Guy Claxton (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), 
112–153.
8 Robert W. Kentridge, Charles A. Heywood, Lawrene Weiskrantz, “Attention without 
awareness in blindsight,” Proceedings of the Royal Society (London) Series B: Biological 
Sciences 266 (1999): 1805–1811.
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his visual field. His performance improved if the target was presented in 
the cued location, although he denied he had had any experiences of the 
targets. Mole9 initially claimed that this is not a case of the dissociation 
between attention and consciousness since the subject did not actually 
attend to the stimuli but rather to the space they occupied. Consciously 
attending to the space resulted in facilitated processing of the stimuli of 
which the subject was not conscious. Thus, this absence of awareness 
and attention applied to different objects: stimuli and space respectively. 
Challenging this, Kentridge, de-Wit and Heywood10 reviewed evidence 
which was supposed to support their claim, namely that spatial attention 
is not deployed unless to determine the properties of objects occupying 
the attended region of space. In other words, there is no spatial attention 
without the specific object in attended space. Thus, space itself cannot 
be an object of spatial attention. In conditions like blindsight, attention 
is oriented to enhance the processing of predefined objects before they 
occur, although the blindsighted person is not aware of this processing 
in statu nascendi. This is seen by the authors as an argument support-
ing their claim that spatial attention is not a sufficient precondition for 
visual awareness. Mole eventually also subscribed to this point of view, 
although he contended that a necessary concomitant of attention must be 
agency.11 In the dispute, the crux of the consciousness-attention problem 
thus lies in the question of reference to an object, in line with traditional 
discussions concerning intentionality as an essential feature of mental 
processes. 
In this state of affairs, I would like to highlight the cognitive phenom-
enon most often referred to as Inhibition of Return (IOR). It was discov-
ered independently by Posner and Cohen12 as well as by Tassinari, Aglioti, 
Chelazzi, Marzi and Berlucchi13 under laboratory conditions using the 
cuing task (or the cost and benefits) paradigm. The onset of the cue in 
the periphery automatically leads to faster and more accurate responses 
to targets at this location than other ones, a finding which seems to be 
9 Mole, “Attention and Consciousness,” 100–103.
10 Kentridge, de-Wit, Heywood, “What is attended in spatial attention?”, 105–111.
11 Mole, “Attention to Unseen Objects,” 41.
12 Michael I. Posner, Yoav Cohen, “Components of visual orienting,” in Attention and 
performance X: Control of language processes, eds. Herman Bouma, Don Bouwhuis 
(London: Erlbaum, 1984), 531–556.
13 Giancarlo Tassinari, Salvatore Aglioti, Leonardo Chelazzi, Carlo Marzi, Giovanni Ber-
lucchi, “Distribution in the visual field of the costs of voluntarily allocated attention 
and of the inhibitory after-effects of covert orienting,” Neuropsychologia 25 (1987): 
55–71.
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in accordance with common sense since it can be easily explained by the 
capture of attention by the cue. However, such processing enhancement 
only takes place at short stimulus onset asynchronies (SOAs). At longer 
SOAs (approximately 300 ms) the diverse effect occurs and the efficacy of 
detection responses to targets at the cued location drops and increases at 
the uncued locations. The phenomenon of IOR is canonically explained 
in terms of inhibitory bias against returning attention to places previously 
attended to and thus promoting attentional activity elsewhere. However, 
the mechanism and even its very nature are considered to be so vague 
that there are arguments against using the very label of ‘inhibition of 
return’ since it may turn out to be a misleading one.14
In the present paper, I suggest that the phenomenon of IOR, when 
analyzed in its dynamic microstructure, can actually serve to showcase 
all of the options considered by the adversaries in the aforementioned 
debate over what can be attended to in spatial attention in the wider 
perspective of the attention-consciousness question. I will argue that, 
over the course of events in the cuing task during which the IOR effect 
occurs, there are also moments that could be described as: attention 
without an object, hence without consciousness of it, and consciousness 
of the object without paying attention to it. The paper is thusly primarily 
of meta-theoretical character to propose a joint perspective for experi-
mental psychology and phenomenology to tackle the problem which 
has been articulated by the authors. My main goal, however, is also to 
follow Mole’s attempt to connect attention with agency. Asking a “What 
is X?” kind of question,15 I will seek to heuristically formulate the latter 
in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological notion of pre-reflective 
intentionality in order to test whether this can help us find the essence 
of IOR as an attentional process, at least from the phenomenologist’s 
standpoint. Thus, I propose conceptualizing IOR as the body-subject’s act 
of turning away from the area of space which s/he has already inspected 
and not turning back, rather having the intention of handling objects 
in new areas. 
14 On this point see Giovani Berlucchi, “Inhibition of return: A phenomenon in search 
of a  mechanism and a  better name,” Cognitive Neuropsychology 23, no. 7 (2006): 
1065–1074.
15 Roman Ingarden, “O pytaniach esencjalnych,” in Z teorii języka i filozoficznych podstaw 
logiki (Warszawa: PWN, 1972), 327–507. 
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2. Inhibition of Return (IOR): An Exception to Brentano’s 
Famous Dictum?
The starting point of the debate on the attention-consciousness prob-
lem, which I have introduced above, is the presumably commonsense 
formula, according to which one is conscious of everything that one pays 
attention to, but one does not pays attention to all the things of which one 
is conscious.16 Analyzing this approach to attention as a sufficient, albeit 
not necessary, precondition for consciousness, it can easily be noticed 
that it rests on an assumption of a noesis-noema structure of attention in 
the sense that attention leads to consciousness, provided that attention 
has an object of which one can be conscious. Following this line of argu-
mentation, it could be logically inferred that if there was attention with-
out an object of which one can be conscious, there could be attention 
without consciousness, i.e., consciousness of an object. Kentridge,  de-Wit 
and Heywood also subscribe to the assumption of a necessary bond 
between spatial attention and its object, although they use it, somehow 
paradoxically, to argue against Mole’s stance and for a possible dissocia-
tion between attention and consciousness. For example, a blindsighted 
individual is able to orient attention towards an object which results in 
dealing with its properties more effectively, although it is an object that 
s/he is not conscious of.17
Situating the question of objects at the heart of the attention-con-
sciousness problem, especially while the controversy concerning the rela-
tion between intentional acts and their objects still seems to be a lively 
issue,18 calls for reconsidering the question as to whether attention must 
indeed have an object. I am inclined to think that a phenomenon worth 
analyzing in this context is Inhibition of Return (IOR) as a cognitive 
effect discovered within an experimental procedure called the cuing 
task paradigm or the cost and benefits paradigm developed by Michael 
Posner and collaborators.19 Over the sequence of events in a version of 
the procedure called an exogenous cuing task (Fig. 1), a subject is sup-
posed to fixate his/her sight at a central point on a computer screen and 
16 Mole, “Attention and Consciousness,” 86.
17 Kentridge, de-Wit, Heywood, “What is attended in spatial attention?”, 105–111.
18 Reuter, “Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality,” 69–70.
19 Michael I. Posner, “Orienting of attention,” Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psycho-
logy 32 (1980): 3–25; Michael I. Posner, Mary Nissen, William Ogden, “Attended and 
unattended processing modes: The role of set for spatial location,” in Modes of percei-
ving and processing information, eds. H.L. Pick, E. Saltzman (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, Inc. 1978), 128–181. 
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then to react to a target stimulus presented at one of two locations, each 
marked by one peripheral box, one to the right and the other to the left 
of the fixation. A variable time before the target appears (SOA – stimulus 
onset asynchrony), an intermediate stimulus is presented to cue the target 
appearance at one of the two possible peripheral locations. The cue may 
be, for example, an increase in luminance of the outline of one of the 
boxes. Responses to targets presented at the cued location are faster and/
or more accurate than responses to targets at the uncued location. From 
the most popular point of view, which was originally advanced by Pos-
ner himself, less effective reactions towards targets presented at uncued 
locations result from an involuntary shift and capture of attention at the 
cued location. After a target stimulus is presented at the uncued location, 
attention must be reoriented to the non-attended but stimulated location. 
This reorienting of attention takes time and therefore causes a delay in 
the latency of a voluntary response towards the target. 
Fig. 1. The sequence of events in the exogenous cueing task.
Analyzing this canonical explanation, one may employ micro-
phenomenology20 to come up with the proposal of a  more detailed 
description of a sequence of events for the whole process. Having been 
instructed to fixate at a central point and to respond to a target, a sub-
ject detects stimulation by a cue which results in an involuntary shift of 
20 Claire Petitmengin, Martijn van Beek, Michel Bitbol, Jean-Michel Nissou, Andreas 
Roepstorff, “What is it like to meditate? Methods and issues for a micro-phenomeno-
logical description of meditative experience,” Journal of Consciousness Studies 24, no. 
5–6 (2017): 170–198.
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covert attention, i.e., attention that does not expresses in eye movements, 
towards the cued location. Attention continues to be captured there after 
the cue disappears and before the target appears. The subject’s cognitive 
activity is then stimulated by the target occurrence which is detected as 
a new stimulus. S/he either employs attention which is already there or 
reorients attention to the uncued location in order to recognize, i.e., to 
become “consciously aware” – as Giacomo Rizzolatti and colleagues put 
it,21 referring to Posner – that the stimulus is a target and subsequently 
voluntarily triggering the reaction. If this description adequately reflects 
the sequence of events, one can discern a gap between disappearance 
of the cue and appearance of the target when there is attention which 
is oriented but there is not an object that is being attended. And if one 
pays attention but there is not any object to it, logically one cannot be 
conscious of such an un-existing object. If so, this facilitatory effect of 
prior information could be considered to be a case of attention without 
consciousness. Moreover, when the target is presented in the uncued 
location, from the subject’s standpoint it is initially detected as a stimulus 
and then attention is reoriented towards it to enhance the processing of 
its attributes in order to determine if it is a target and if a response should 
be emitted. Again, if this is so and if stimulus detection means ‘conscious 
awareness of the stimulus’(ibid.), consciousness precedes attention. In 
other words, there is a state in the sequence of events, that the exog-
enous cuing task consists of, which can be described as consciousness 
without attention. Referring the above analysis of the overall exogenous 
cuing task to the presumably commonsense picture of the relationship 
between attention and consciousness,22 according to which consciousness 
is a necessary concomitant of attention but attention is not a necessary 
concomitant of consciousness, it could be used in support of the latter 
point but against the former.
The subject can attend, i.e., s/he can be in the state of allocating atten-
tion, without necessarily having an object in the world that is the object 
of this state, hence the object that s/he is conscious of. This is, however, 
a description that Kentridge, de-Wit and Heywood, would not subscribe 
to. They argue that spatial attention is not directed in space (like a gaze 
wandering in the dark or in a thick mist) unless with the intention of 
21 On this point see p. 32 in Giacomo Rizzolatti, Lucia Riggio, Isabella Dascola, Car-
lo Umiltá, “Reorienting Attention Across the Horizontal And Vertical Meridians: 
Evidence in Favour of a Premotor Theory of Attention,” Neuropsychologia 25, no. 1A 
(1987): 31–40. 
22 Mole, “Attention and Consciousness,” 86.
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enhancing the processing of the specific objects which inhabit it.23 Yet, 
according to the authors, they are objects that one is not always conscious 
of.24 I think that it might be true that spatial attention is oriented with the 
intention of finding specific objects in space. I can even presume, at least 
for the sake of heuristics, that it is always the case. It would, however, still 
be difficult to deny the moment in the sequence of the cuing task when 
and where, after a cue disappears and before a target appears, attention 
has been captured and continues to be oriented but there is no object in 
space, hence there is no object that one could attend to. 
I am also inclined to think that following the sequence of events 
further in the cuing task after the facilitatory effect finishes, one arrives 
at the standpoint from which the question of the relation between atten-
tion and its object in the context of the attention-consciousness prob-
lem may appear in still more light. It is when the time interval between 
a cue and a target exceeds approximately 300 ms. Then, reaction times 
to targets presented at previously stimulated locations are longer than 
to targets presented in new locations (Fig. 1b) which may seem to be 
against commonsense, since a cue imperatively captures attention and 
thus should pave the way for reactions at the cued locations. This afteref-
fect, most often referred to as “inhibition of return,” is typically described 
in terms of a sequence of events in which attention is first drawn to the 
location of an uninformative stimulus and then abandons that location 
and “develops a bias against returning to it.” There are doubts about this 
interpretation25 and even about IOR being an attentional phenomenon 
at all.26 If this canonical interpretation is, however, adequate, I would like 
to make it a case to be a potential challenge for Brentano’s famous dic-
tum of necessary “in-existence” of particular objects within intentional 
acts, e.g., attentional ones, and for Kentridge and colleagues’ approach 
to follow, although not explicitly, to claim that spatial attention always 
has a specific object.
2.1. Orienting Attention away from an Object not to be Conscious of It
After some time, attention is biased away from a location which it has 
already attended and instead becomes biased toward novel locations or/
23 Kentridge, de-Wit, Heywood, “What is attended in spatial attention?”, 105–111.
24 Ibidem.
25 See e.g., Giovani Berlucchi, “Inhibition of return,” 1065–1074.
26 See e.g., Tracy L. Taylor, Raymond M. Klein, “On the causes and effects of inhibition of 
return,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 5 (1998): 625–643.
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and events.27 Taking for granted this interpretation of IOR as a precise 
report on the sequence of events in the cuing task, inhibition of return 
could be described as being about “novelty seeking,” an explanation 
reminiscent of Posner and colleagues.28 It would encourage orienting 
toward novel, potentially salient, events in the environment. In this way, 
it might be considered the case of attention without a particular object, 
hence without consciousness of it, at least until an object is presented. 
Of course, one could also argue that a subject is instructed to respond to 
the predefined stimulus in the exogenous cuing task. This is why IOR is 
not just about orienting to otherness and elsewhereness. It encourages 
the orienting of attention toward new locations but in order to search for 
the targets specified in the instruction given to the subject, which would 
make it just another case of spatial attention deployed with the goal of 
determining the properties of specific objects occupying the attended 
region of space, according to Kentridge, de-Wit, and Heywood.29
I would, however, again highlight the particular moment in the 
sequence of events in the cuing task when attention continues to be 
oriented before the target, i.e., an object, is presented. We did it already, 
referring to the facilitatory effect when attention is captured by a cue and 
remains at the cued location after the cue has disappeared which is sup-
posed to result in the target being processed more effectively if it appears 
at this location than as it appears at the uncued one. This time, however, 
during IOR, it is oriented away from the cued location. Thus, it is done 
so not by an exogenous cue but somewhat inside-out, top-down, or from 
within an agent which, in anyway, requires some kind of agency – a point 
I will expand upon later. That is why one could also meaningfully call 
such an act of orienting as “endogenous,” if this term were not technically 
reserved for another version of the cuing task. Whatever we term it, the 
point is that attention is oriented toward the uncued location, although 
there is no object there yet, which would again make it a case of atten-
tion without an object, hence attention without consciousness (of an 
object). One could, of course, dismiss this interpretation by arguing that 
although in the cuing task a subject (re)orients attention with intention 
27 Raymond M. Klein, “Inhibitory tagging system facilitates visual search,” Nature 334 
(1988): 430–443; Raymond M. Klein, Joseph W. MacInnes, “Inhibition of return is 
a foraging facilitator in visual search,” Psychological Science 10 (1999): 346–352.
28 Michael I. Posner, Robert D. Rafal, Lisa Choate, Jonathan Vaughan, “Inhibition of 
return: Neural basis and function,” Cognitive Neuropsychology 2 (1985): 211–228. See 
also Kristie Dukewich, “Reconceptualizing inhibition of return as habituation of the 
orienting response,” Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 16, no. 2 (2009): 238–251.
29 Kentridge, de-Wit, Heywood, “What is attended in spatial attention?”, 105.
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to engage in the target before it actually appears there, it is already bound 
to this intention, hence to attentional act, let us say – mentally, e.g., in 
working memory. For example, an observer directs her/his attention 
somewhere, expecting that the specific object that s/he is bearing in 
mind might come to exist there. In other words, the non-existence of 
the object in the environment at a particular point of time does not 
necessarily rule out the “in-existence” of it as an intentional/attentional 
object then. Regardless of this issue, which confronts the behaviorist’s 
purview with those of less hard-nosed psychologists, I am inclined to 
think that IOR can be considered a case of attention without an object, 
hence attention without consciousness, but yet consciousness without 
attention, because of some essential feature of this phenomenon which 
is rather overlooked in its “canonical interpretations.” However, I would 
once again like to underline that the point I am going to raise rests on 
the assumption that IOR is an attentional phenomenon. And given the 
state-of-the-art knowledge of this effect, this may still be considered an 
open question.30 
This essential point which yet seems to be either missing or left vague 
in the descriptions of IOR is that this is a phenomenon of orienting of 
attention not only in terms of attention being biased toward but also in 
terms of attention being biased away. The former might even be con-
sidered as merely being the consequence of the latter, although this is 
a question that might require an accompanying intellectual apparatus of 
ontology and logics. To interpret the matter more cautiously – they are 
aspects of the IOR effect that reciprocally determine each other. Turn-
ing away from some region of space or away from the objects occupying 
this location is also an act of directing one’s attention. Spatial attention 
can be directed to engage with objects at a certain region of space – but 
also not to engage with them. Inhibition of return would be a case of the 
latter. To some extent, it would then be the case of attention without an 
object and the term “object” would also refer to space. Thus, in regard to 
Mole’s stance in the aforementioned dispute on what can be attended in 
spatial attention, IOR can be considered as the case of attention without 
an object in terms of specific stimuli but also in terms of locations in 
space inhabited by particular objects. Moreover, by also appealing to the 
functional role of attention as a gateway to consciousness, i.e., as what 
30 Juan Lupiáñez, Raymond M. Klein, Paolo Bartolomeo, “Inhibition of return: Twenty 
years after,” Cognitive Neuropsychology 23 (2006): 1003–1014.
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makes something accessible for consciousness,31 IOR can be character-
ized as attention deployed so as not to be conscious of it. Referring this 
description to the typology of spatial attention widely used in experimen-
tal psychology, which includes attention as “selection-for-perception” 
and as “selection-for-action,” IOR would be considered “selection-not-
for-perception” and “selection-not-for-action.” 
Reconceptualizing the inhibition of return as an act of orienting away 
from objects (both as stimuli and as locations in space), and thus not 
being conscious of them, makes it possible to consider IOR as a case 
of an intentional act which does not contain an object within itself. It 
can be then used as an exception to Brentano’s dictum of the “inexist-
ence” of objects within intentional acts and an argument against a nec-
essary noesis-noema structure of psychological activity – according to 
Husserl. In this way, it could also be used in favor of Merleau-Ponty’s 
approach to intentionality. According to the French phenomenologist, 
there can be intentional acts which are not of or about anything specific 
but are directed towards the lived world (Lifeworld) which is inhabited 
by objects.32 This is why the bond between acts, e.g., attentional ones, 
and their objects may be rather loose.
Another potential argument for the stance that a subject can attend, 
i.e., s/he can be in the state of allocating attention, without necessarily 
having an object in the world that is the object of this state, hence the 
object that s/he is conscious of, might be pointed to while following fur-
ther the sequence of events that IOR consists of. After about 300 ms from 
when a cue is presented at a given location, a bias develops against return-
ing attention there and toward an uncued location. This bias encourag-
ing, and thus orienting, attention elsewhere develops - what should be 
underlined once again – before a target is presented and then there is 
no other object in the visual field. That is why the question arises – what 
is this attentional bias toward? Of course, one can come up with a sug-
gestion, as Kentridge and colleagues would, that the subject’s intention 
is to react to a predefined ‘in-existing’ target which s/he bears in mind 
all that time. This bias would be thus toward that particular distinctive 
object. Would it not, however, be more rigorous to presume that in that 
very moment when attention is already directed, it is rather directed 
at nothing which registers in consciousness? Or, that if it is directed at 
31 Declan Smithies, “Attention is Rational Access Consciousness,” in Attention: Philosop-
hical and Psychological Essays, eds. Christopher Mole, Declan Smithies, Wayne Wu 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 247–273.
32 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 381. On this point see also Reuter, “Mer-
leau-Ponty’s Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality,” 69.
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anything, it would be “an area of free space” in the “plenum of the world,” 
as Merleau-Ponty would dub it.33 I will return to this question later but, 
whatever the answer is, his notion of pre-reflective intentionality pro-
vides a conceptual framework into which this explanation can be fitted. 
3. Is IOR the Case of Consciousness without Attention?
If IOR might be explained – as I have suggested above – as attention 
being directed with an intention of not being conscious of objects in some 
regions in space, although the subject can still detect and properly react 
to targets in those locations, it thus seems that the term inattentive atten-
tion would be well suited to addressing this phenomenon. The question, 
however, arises as to whether it would not be more adequate to describe 
it as a case of consciousness without attention. In other words, if con-
sciousness is not a necessary concomitant of attention, should attention 
also be conceptualized as an unnecessary concomitant of consciousness? 
In order to address this question, it is useful to once again look more 
closely at the basic vocabulary instrument employed in IOR research and 
the time course of the effect itself. Thus, if the “attentional bias toward” 
novel events which results from “inhibition of attention” to previous ones 
means that attention is oriented away from the cued location after about 
300 ms to not return, one can assume that it is not at there. Yet, when 
a target is presented at the cued location, a subject is still able to react to 
it. S/he does so slower than when it is presented at the uncued location 
but still does so. At first glance, it may appear that consciousness runs 
ahead of attention here. I think that in order to confirm as to whether 
this first thought is correct, one needs to follow the leading question here, 
namely why are the reactions to targets presented at the cued locations 
slower than to targets at the uncued ones during IOR? I am also inclined 
to think that the most common explanation of the effect, according to 
which a delay in the latency of a voluntary response towards targets at the 
cued locations results from the time consuming reorienting of attention,34 
does not seem satisfying. Moreover, it may transpire that the satisfactory 
answer to that question requires a concept of what constitutes attention 
in its very essence – spatial attention in this case. To address this ques-
tion, I would like to apply micro-phenomenology once again and take 
33 Ibidem, 111.
34 Michael I. Posner, Charles R.R. Snyder, Brian J. Davidson, “Attention and the detection 
of signals, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 109 (1980b): 160–174.
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a closer look at the micro-structure of IOR, hoping to derive a possible 
description of its micro-dynamics. 
During IOR, attention is biased toward uncued locations. What hap-
pens, when a target is presented at the cued one? According to the afore-
mentioned canonical explanation, attention is reoriented and engaged 
in the target which then triggers a response to follow. This reorienting 
takes time which is not needed if a target is presented at the uncued 
location, because attention is already there in the latter case. Is, however, 
this explanation really as persuasive as it is commonly thought to be? 
Why would attention be reoriented at the cued location in the first place? 
Despite having sight fixated only at a central point, the whole of a com-
puter screen is in the subject’s visual field and s/he can still perceive the 
events happening all over it. Moreover, people have known for millennia 
that we can use peripheral vision to look at things and see them ‘out of the 
corner of the eye’. This is especially true when the object to be perceived 
is so simple and easy to recognize in terms of its perceptual structure 
as the objects used in the role of a target in typical cuing tasks. That is 
why, using common sense, one could argue that reorienting attention 
toward a cued location which consumes time is simply not needed. Of 
course, on the other side of the argument, one could still push for an 
idea of attention as some kind of power which is necessary in order to 
make perception effective. Would not, however, such an idea of attention 
appear so naïve that it would provoke some researchers, including those 
as prominent as Donald Broadbent, to ironically term it “a mysterious 
asset or energy” and to suggest that avoiding the very category of atten-
tion would be “a step towards clarity?”35
In the face of this vague picture of IOR, I would like to come up 
with two possible explanations of this phenomenon by referring it to 
the question as to whether it can be considered a case of consciousness 
without attention. I will start by suggesting that the key thing in this 
context is the question of how it is at all possible that attention is reori-
ented toward a certain location after having been biased away from it 
and biased toward the other one. If attention is oriented elsewhere, and 
it is commonly considered as a strict condition to trigger reaction, i.e., 
I cannot respond to a target unless I pay attention to it, what is it that 
triggers attention itself? The logical answer, and perhaps the only possible 
one, is that it must be something that precedes attention and initiates 
this chain reaction of responses. Thus, this cognitive process which runs 
35 On this point see p. 253 in Donald E. Broadbent, “Task-Combination and Selective 
Intake of Information,” Acta Psychologica 50 (1982): 253–290.
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ahead of attention must be something independent of it. In other words, 
one perceives things that one does not pay attention to. This process can 
be described in terms of stimulus detection. According to Posner who 
distinguishes orienting from detecting, detection “means to be aware or 
conscious of the stimulus.”36 He goes on to describe this act –
By detecting I will mean that a stimulus has reached a level of the nervous 
system at which it is now possible for the subject to report its presence by 
arbitrary responses that the experimenter may assign. These may be verbal 
(“I see it”) or manual (pressing a key).37
However, according to the “scenario” of IOR which I derived, such an 
approach would be akin to a short cut. Detecting can indeed be under-
stood in terms of becoming aware or conscious of the stimulus but only 
in the sense of awareness that an object has just appeared without fur-
ther specifying its attributes and possibly recognizing it as the target. 
In this way, although the subject’s attention is biased away from it, s/
he perceives that something has just happened. So far, receiving a sig-
nal of the stimulus appearing in the unattended region is the case of 
consciousness without attention. And after that, attention follows being 
shifted to enhance the cognitive processing of this initially vague object 
in order to determine if it is a target and to possibly trigger the reaction, 
e.g., saying “I see it” or “pressing a key.” Otherwise, equating “detect-
ing” with an object registering in consciousness as the target, without 
including this intermediary phase of detecting it merely as an unspecific 
object – in the way Posner seems to – would suggest that when attention 
is biased away and then reoriented toward the target, the subject is con-
scious of the target exactly at the same time when attention starts to be 
reoriented and before it has been reoriented in order to be conscious of 
it, which obviously sounds contradictory. Thus, following the sequence 
of events during IOR and the metaphor of attention as a doorway to 
consciousness, one may say that an object arrives at its threshold as an 
unidentified stranger, it is then attended to and becomes fully accessible 
for conscious use.
There is also another way to explain the difference in reaction times 
to targets at the cued and uncued locations during IOR, despite the 
fact that the whole of a scene is within the visual field, without getting 
involved into fuzzy conceptualizations of attention as “a mysterious asset 
36 Posner, “Orienting of attention,” 4.
37 Ibidem.
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or energy.” It thus requires addressing the question of what it is which we 
call attention. One of the answers may be that attention is not a distinct, 
i.e., modally independent, psychological entity but motor preparation, 
i.e., readiness for goal directed actions such as eye-movements. In this 
way, a bias toward events at uncued locations resulting in longer reaction 
times to targets at the cued ones during IOR can be explained in terms 
of the subject’s readiness and being prepared for motor actions at the 
locations which have not yet been attended. 
4. Attention and Embodied Agency
Over the course of the dispute concerning the closeness of the bond 
between attention and consciousness, Christopher Mole initially advo-
cated the view that it is an inseparable one.38 Later, he admitted that there 
are reasons for abandoning this claim. He retained, however, the stance 
that a necessary concomitant of attention is agency.39 Incidentally, this 
approach seems to resonate with the prominent, albeit widely overlooked, 
claim of William James which associates attention with volition.40 I would 
like to subscribe to this general point of view but also to offer a specific 
understanding of agency that would be deployed to address the lead-
ing question of the previous section, namely: Why are the reactions to 
targets presented at the cued locations slower than to targets appearing 
at the uncued ones during IOR? And why is it so, despite the whole of 
the scene being within the visual field and there being no reasons for 
any visual acuity deficits?
I believe that a conceptual framework which could possibly suit this 
purpose is the Premotor Theory of Attention (PToA). It is one of the 
influential, albeit controversial,41 modern accounts of attention which 
appears to follow the tradition of the deflationary treatment of this cat-
egory as a dispensable one. According to its authors,42 motor preparation 
is both necessary and sufficient for spatial attention. “The condition in 
which action is ready but its execution is delayed corresponds to what is 
38 Mole, “Attention and Consciousness,” 86.
39 Mole, “Attention to Unseen Objects,” 41.
40 On this point see p. 424 in William James, The Principles of Psychology (New York: 
Dover, 1890).
41 Daniel T. Smith, Thomas Schenk, “The Premotor theory of attention: Time to move 
on?”, Neuropsychologia 50, no. 6 (2012): 1104–1114.
42 Giacomo Rizzolatti, Lucia Riggio, Isabella Dascola, Carlo Umiltá, “Reorienting Atten-
tion Across the Horizontal And Vertical Meridians,” 31–40.
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introspectively called spatial attention.”43 Since visual attention is func-
tionally equivalent to motor preparation, there is no need for a substan-
tive independent theory of attention. That is also why we have not dis-
covered specific neural correlates of visual attention as an independent, 
specific cognitive phenomenon.44 The PToA has been formulated on the 
basis of experimental data showing that responses to stimuli presented 
in  the cued hemifield are faster than those in the uncued one, even 
though the distance between cue and stimulus in the cued hemifield is 
greater. This phenomenon was called the meridian effect and explained 
in terms of the temporal cost of reprogramming the vector of eye move-
ments which is to result in the latency of the saccade in the opposite 
direction being longer.45 
In light of the PToA, inhibitory bias against returning attention to 
the previously attended regions that results in attentional bias toward 
events in the unattended ones, which is what IOR is about, is not so 
much a consequence of a program or a plan for motor actions directed 
at stimuli located in the uncued areas as it is motor preparation for reac-
tions at there as such. If spatial attention is to be functionally equivalent 
to the preparation of motor activity, i.e., some readiness to execute eye-
movements in a certain direction, the condition in which this preparation 
is impaired should also have an impact on the effect of IOR. The experi-
mental data suggest that it might be true. Michalczyk, Paszulewicz, Bielas 
and Wolski have recently demonstrated, with the use of an eye abduction 
technique, that preparation of eye movements disrupted in the temporal 
half-space results in IOR attenuation in that area, compared to the nasal 
part of the visual field in which eye movement was not restricted and 
IOR did not diminish.46 To sum up, the results suggest that it is enough to 
disrupt oculomotor programming, or to put it plainly – motor ability, to 
reduce the attentional bias expressed in the IOR effect, although there are 
no visual acuity deficits. That is how they support the Premotor Theory of 
Attention which reduces spatial attention to motor preparation. However, 
43 Laila Craighero, Luciano Fadiga, Giacomo Rizzolatti, Carlo Umiltà, “Action for per-
ception: a motor-visual attentional effect,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance 25 (1999): 1673.
44 Giacomo Rizzolatti, Lucia Riggio, Boris Sheliga, “Space and selective attention,” Atten-
tion and performance, XV, 15, (1994): 231–265; Laila Craighero, Giacomo Rizzolatti, 
“The premotor theory of attention,” in Neurobiology of Attention, eds. L. Itti, G. Rees, J. 
Tsotsos (Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2005), 181–186.
45 Rizzolatti et al. “Reorienting Attention Across the Horizontal And Vertical Meridians: 
Evidence in Favour of a Premotor Theory of Attention,” 37. 
46 Łukasz Michalczyk, Jakub Paszulewicz, Jacek Bielas, Piotr Wolski, “Is Saccade Prepara-
tion Required for Inhibition of Return (IOR)?”, Neuroscience Letters 665 (2018): 13–17.
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there is no consensus on the presumably motoric nature of spatial atten-
tion. The results presented by Michalczyk and colleagues are still rather 
at odds with the mainstream research findings on this matter, including 
the question of the mechanism underlying IOR.47 There is, however, 
a growing body of research results linking spatial attention closely with 
the programming of eye movement48 and I am inclined to think that it 
should still be considered an open question.
Reconceptualizing attention in terms of sensori-motor machinery, 
which seems to be embedded in the idea of embodied cognition and 
the vocabulary adopted by the Premotor Theory of Attention, can again 
be considered in reference to Merleau-Ponty’s notion of pre-reflective 
intentionality.49 The French phenomenologist seeks to articulate it as 
the basic cognitive act of directing which derives from bodily motility, 
making it possible for the moving body-subject to reach out to things in 
the world and to reflect on them. It means that the properties tradition-
ally ascribed to the human subject are constituted in its bodily nature. 
Hence, the exercise of agency consists primarily in “motor intentionality”. 
The subject “of movement keeps in front of him an area of free space in 
which …”50 the body “surges towards objects to be grasped and perceives 
them.”51
Our bodily experience of movement (…) provides us with a way of access 
to the world and the object, with a ‘praktognosia’, which has to be recog-
nized as original and perhaps as primary.52
47 See e.g., Daniel T. Smith, Thomas Schenk, “The Premotor theory of attention,” 1104–
1114; Soazig Casteau, Daniel T. Smith, “Covert attention beyond the range of eye-
-movements: Evidence for a dissociation between exogenous and endogenous orien-
ting,” Cortex (2018), doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2018.11.007.
48 Daniel Baldauf, Heiner Deubel, “Properties of attentional selection during the prepa-
ration of sequential saccades,” Experimental Brain Research, 184, no. 3, (2008): 411–425; 
Łukasz Michalczyk, Jacek Bielas, “The gap effect reduces both manual and saccadic 
inhibition of return (IOR),” Experimental Brain Research, 237, no. 7, (2019): 1643–1653; 
Łukasz Michalczyk, Jacek Bielas, Anna Schab, “Preparation of saccade sequences and 
eye programming affect endogenous covert attention,” European Journal of Neuro-
science 52, no. 5 (2020): 3419–3433.
49 Jacek Bielas, Łukasz Michalczyk, “Is the premotor theory of attention essentially abo-
ut pre-reflective intentionality?”, Theory & Psychology 29, no. 6 (2019): 757–774, doi.
org/10.1177/0959354319834672.




That is why pre-reflective intentionality is rather about an “I can” than 
an “I think.” “Bodily space and external space form a practical system, 
in which bodily space is the background against which objects may … 
become visible and function as goals for action.”53
Inspired by Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological account, one might 
explain IOR in terms of the body-subject’s turning away from the region 
of space which has just been attended to without the intention of turn-
ing back. The body’s act of directing – i.e., becoming bodily situated in 
such dimensions of a lived, “phenomenal” spatiality as: “up, down,” “on, 
under,” “near to, far from”54 – is in a strict sense an intention to get in 
touch with the objects (manipulanda),55 which inhabit the Lifeworld, and 
manipulate upon them. In terms of the Premotor Theory of Attention, 
one would relate it to the motor preparation of body effectors to attend 
to the incoming stream of stimuli. From such a joint perspective, i.e., that 
of the phenomenologist and the experimental psychologist, the effect of 
IOR would be explained in terms of pre-reflective bodily intentionality 
or motor preparation to act upon objects at new locations rather than at 
the previously attended ones. Attention reconceptualized in such terms 
would be indeed strictly bound to the agency which manifests itself in 
the embodied subject’s intentionality, plan or preparation, to re-act upon 
objects in certain regions of space.
Thus, the controversial notion that consciousness is a necessary con-
comitant of attention in a way that one is conscious of everything that 
one pays attention to, could be reformulated into an apparently less con-
troversial rule, according to which agency is a necessary concomitant of 
attention in a way that one orients bodily towards everything that one 
intends to attend to. And the same could be done in reference to another 
presumably commonsense point that attention is not a necessary con-
comitant of consciousness in a way that one does not pay attention to all 
the things of which one is conscious. According to such a new formula, 
attention would not be a necessary concomitant of agency i.e., one does 
not intend to attend to all the things that one is bodily oriented towards. 
The latter formula could be deployed to denote the essence of the inhibi-
tion of return. The body-subject orients away from the events in the cued 
locations but is involuntarily reoriented back there towards imperative 
53 On this point see Reuter, “Merleau-Ponty’s Notion of Pre-Reflective Intentionality,” 73.
54 On this point see Russell Keat, Merleau-Ponty and the phenomenology of the body 
(Unpublished manuscript, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, UK, 1982). Retrieved 
from http://www.russellkeat.net/admin/papers/51.pdf, 8.
55 Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, 105.
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stimuli which are presented in those already attended and abandoned 
regions. This redirecting of the action-oriented bodily organization is 
naturally time consuming, which explains the longer reaction times to 
objects in the area of space that has been left behind by the body-subject. 
Analyzing the effect of IOR within a conceptual framework which 
includes the notion of agency could also shed some new light on the 
sharp division between two versions of the cuing task paradigm that 
are thought to depend on the types of orienting involved: exogenous or 
endogenous. If endogenous orienting can be understood as the manifes-
tation of agency, such an agentic component may be traced to the very 
essence of IOR, even in the exogenous cuing task, because the inhibi-
tory bias in question is induced from nowhere else but from within the 
organism itself and is then overcome by an outer imperative target at 
the cued location. 
Conclusion
In the face of the controversial epistemological status of attention as 
a category with explanatory work to do, and of a warning against confus-
ing it with other categories like, for example, consciousness,56 an attempt 
to shed light on the relation between attention and consciousness seems 
particularly needed. At the crux of the dispute Mole vs. Kentridge, de-Wit 
and Heywood on the mutual relations between attention and conscious-
ness, to which I have been referring in this paper, was the question of 
what can be attended to in spatial attention. This question can be natu-
rally linked to the phenomenological issue of intentionality. In this meta-
theoretical state of affairs, I proposed analyzing the phenomenon called 
Inhibition of Return (IOR), which was discovered and studied within the 
cuing task paradigm, suggesting that, following its micro dynamics, it can 
be used to actually showcase various possibilities of relations between 
attention and consciousness. Over the course of events in the cuing task 
during which the IOR effect occurs, there are moments that could be 
described as: attention without an object, hence without consciousness 
of it, and consciousness of the object without paying attention to it. My 
main objective in this paper, however, was to refer the effect of IOR to 
the question of intentionality, something which was originally concep-
tualized in the field of phenomenology. I have thus also followed Mole’s 
suggestion to link attention with agency. I propose explaining IOR in 
56 Allport, “Attention and performance,” 113.
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terms of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of embodied pre-reflective intentional-
ity to test whether this can be a route to arriving at the essence of what 
is commonly called attention. From the phenomenologist’s standpoint, 
the phenomenon of IOR would be described as the body-subject’s turn-
ing away from the already attended region of space with the intention 
of acting upon objects in new locations. In reverse order, I also suggest 
that the experimental investigation of IOR can be used as an argument 
in favor of Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of intentionality versus that 
of Husserl (Brentano), namely that intentional acts are directed towards 
rather than being of or about something. 
My overriding goal in this paper, however, is obviously not so much 
to resolve its leading questions as to propose a meta-theoretical platform 
and to provoke both experimental psychologists and phenomenologists 
to utilizing it and tackle them. 
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